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RESTRAINING LAWYERS:
FROM “CASES” TO “TASKS”
Morris A. Ratner*
INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in the domains of procedure and private contract
highlight a continuing shift of authority away from lawyers and toward
courts and clients eager to control litigation costs. The shift has been
accomplished in part via an unbundling of “cases” into “tasks,” by virtue of
which courts and clients have greater opportunities to demand that each task
adds sufficient value to justify its cost.1
In the sphere of procedure, the December 2015 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“the Rules”) reinforce and expand court
involvement in active case management and at the same time require parties
and courts to more squarely consider proportionality when defining the
scope of discovery allowed in a particular case. These changes build on a
decades-long trend of “managerial judging,”2 which inserts the judge as a
kind of regulatory authority into areas where lawyers seeking to achieve
clients’ broadly stated goals traditionally acted with less oversight. That
judicial management involves unbundling “cases” and converting them into
“tasks,” from motion practice to discovery, where the judge prioritizes and
sequences each task to find the most efficient route to a resolution, e.g., by
dispositive motion or settlement.
The market has moved in a similar direction supported by changes in
information, project management technologies, and competition among law

* Associate Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law. The author thanks the
Fordham Law Review, the Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham University School of
Law, Bruce Green, Sherri Levine, and fellow participants in this year’s colloquium entitled
Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials held at Fordham University School of
Law. For an overview of the colloquium, see Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the
Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates,
and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2017).
1. The observation and this Article’s title riff on a classic 1991 article by Professor
Judith Resnik that observed a shift in perspective and practice from individual cases to broad
categories of litigation that could be resolved in the aggregate. See Judith Resnik, From
“Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991).
2. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494, 534 (1986) (“Managerial judging employs the trial judge as a case manager, moving a
lawsuit from filing to disposition.”); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV.
374, 380–81 (1982) (distinguishing “adversarial” and “inquisitorial” systems in large part on
the basis of the relative authority between client and judge).
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firms.3 Clients looking to control legal spending are unbundling legal work
to assign tasks, rather than cases, to individual lawyers or firms, applying
procurement principles to source legal projects to the most cost-efficient
providers.
These same forces have increased the prevalence and
commitment to litigation budgets and have pushed flat and other “valuebased” pricing into a variety of litigation settings. Both mechanisms better
align the financial interests of lawyers and clients while facilitating client
input into the tasks undertaken to achieve litigation aims. The result is an
erosion of the traditional division of authority between lawyer and client
along the means-ends continuum.
Implicit in these procedural and market developments is a recognition
that the key to conserving the courts’ and parties’ resources is restraining
lawyer discretion with regard to litigation tasks, either directly, by shifting
decision-making authority, or indirectly, by manipulating lawyers’ financial
incentives. The economic theory behind this perception is presumably that,
either as a result of their financial incentives (such as those produced by an
hourly fee) or as a result of the perceived benefits of strategic
gamesmanship (such as the desire to impose litigation costs on an
adversary), unrestrained lawyers will not make litigation choices that
achieve the cost-containment aims of a court or client.
These regulatory and market mechanisms for restraining lawyers share a
common thread but differ in their purposes, efficacy, and fairness. Despite
these differences, the growing intensity of their focus, and their possible
amplification of each other, suggest the possibility of the emergence of new
professional norms that call on litigators to think more deeply and
inclusively about value from the perspective of court and client when
making litigation choices.
I. SCARCITY, CONTROL, AND VALUATION OF TASKS IN THE SPHERE
OF PROCEDURE: THE DECEMBER 2015 RULE AMENDMENTS
The managerial judging movement that gained traction4 in the 1980s was
propelled by the perceived need to more efficiently manage dockets in light
of concerns regarding scarcity.5 The movement has converted the trial
3. Technological developments include new data storage, communication, budget, and
timekeeping software both for tracking and projecting future project timelines and costs.
See, e.g., William D. Henderson, Three Generations of U.S. Lawyers: Generalists,
Specialists, Project Managers, 70 MD. L. REV. 373, 383 (2011) (describing by way of
example Cisco Systems, Inc.’s legal department’s use of an information management
platform to “capture the full context of prior work, facilitate information sharing, develop
internal expertise, save time, and obtain better legal outcomes”). See generally Drew
Hendricks, How Technology Has Revitalized Project Management, TECH.CO (Mar. 25,
2015), http://tech.co/technology-revitalized-project-management-2015-03 [https://perma.cc/
HVZ5-NS79].
4. The 1983 rewrite of Rule 16 was a watershed moment for the movement. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“Given the significant changes
in federal civil litigation since 1938 that are not reflected in Rule 16, it has been extensively
rewritten and expanded to meet the challenges of modern litigation.”).
5. See FABIEN GELINAS ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL JUSTICE: TOWARD A VALUEBASED FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM 93 (2015) (“The search for efficiency in the face of a
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court judge from a relatively passive arbiter of pretrial disputes6 to an active
architect of the litigation process whose aim is to achieve a proper
allocation of scarce procedural resources.7
The December 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
reinforce this trend. Amended Rule 1 advances that goal by adjusting the
normative interpretive framework8 for the Rules, operating at the level of
the attorney’s role as advocate. The amendment adds the following
language to the familiar value statement that the Rules should be construed
and administered to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of the action: “and employed by the court and the parties.”9 Writing in his
2015 annual report, Justice Roberts noted that these additional words are a
“big deal” and “make express the obligation of judges and lawyers to work
cooperatively in controlling the expense and time demands of litigation—an
obligation given effect in the amendments that follow.”10
The amendments to Rule 16 reduce the time to enter scheduling orders
from 120 to 90 days, encourage in-person case management conferences,11
and facilitate greater interaction with the court before the filing of discovery
motions by giving the trial court discretion to direct that movants request
court conferences before filing motions.12 In short, it puts the trial court
judge in the position of carving up cases and disputes earlier and more
often.13 In general, Rule 16 confers that ability by allowing the judge to
sequence pretrial activity, including motion practice and discovery.14 In the
growing crisis due to scarce judicial resources seems to be the primary value expounded by
the proponents of managerial judging.”). But see Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray:
The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences of Unfounded
Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1994) (questioning the scarcity narrative).
6. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 395, 405 (1906) (describing the historical image of the trial
court judge as a “mere umpire”).
7. See E. Donald Elliot, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 306, 311 (1986) (“The prototypical ‘managerial’ decision is one that allocates
limited resources.”).
8. Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV.
U. L. REV. 287, 287–88 (2010) (describing Rule 1 as the “master rule” that determines how
all other Rules are interpreted and applied).
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
10. JOHN ROBERTS, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5–6 (2015),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BW5S-QP8H].
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“The provision
for consulting at a scheduling conference by ‘telephone, mail, or other means’ is deleted.”).
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(v).
13. “Judges must be willing to take on a stewardship role, managing their cases from the
outset rather than allowing parties alone to dictate the scope of discovery and the pace of
litigation.” ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 10.
14. See, e.g., JOHN G. HEYBURN II & BARBARA JACOBS ROTHSTEIN, TEN STEPS TO
BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION TRANSFEREE JUDGES
4 (2009) (“Sequencing the discovery and briefing necessary to resolve class certification and
summary judgment motions is one of your most vital initial tasks.”); Robert G. Bone, Who
Decides?: A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1968
(2007) (“Discretionary case management extends to the appointment of litigation committees
in complex cases, sequencing of issues, scheduling of discovery, timing of summary
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most extreme incarnation, the managerial judge not only cabins party and
attorney discretion to make litigation choices but eclipses party and lawyer
altogether.15 For example, in the World Trade Center litigation, a
frustrated16 Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein entered a case management order
under Rule 16 and used his inherent authority to appoint his own experts to
help him impose a discovery agenda, schedule, and process.17
Amended Rule 26 operates to limit party and attorney discretion by
mandating a consideration of the value of discovery at the time lawyers
frame discovery requests and by encouraging judges to more energetically
insert themselves into that valuation as to each disputed request.18 It does
so by moving the proportionality requirement into the scope of the
discovery subsection of Rule 26(b).19 The amendment thus serves as a kind
of exclamation point after the proportionality requirement.20 Though the
Advisory Committee notes to the most recent amendment emphasize the
importance of various proportionality factors, in practice it is the
consideration of whether the burden of discovery outweighs its likely
benefit that is at the heart of the proportionality inquiry.21
These amendments operate as top-down pressure from Rule drafters on
judges, parties, and lawyers to move even further away from the lawyer-

judgment and trial, and much more.”). See generally WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER & ALAN
HIRSCH, THE ELEMENTS OF CASE MANAGEMENT: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2d ed.
2006).
15. For a discussion of the history of Rule 16 and the degree to which it was designed to
give judges discretion, see David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and
Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969 (1989).
16. See generally Alvin K. Hellerstein, James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Managerial Judging: The 9/11 Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127
(2012).
17. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 501, 523–24
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
18. This change “may, as a practical matter, require ‘judges to be more aggressive in
identifying and discouraging discovery overuse by emphasizing the need to analyze
proportionality before ordering production of relevant information.’” XTO Energy, Inc. v.
ATD, LLC, No. CIV 14-1021, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57050, at *58 (D.N.M. Apr. 1, 2016)
(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Fayda, 14 Civ. 9792 (WHP) (JCF), 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 162164, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2015)).
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. See
generally Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of
Proportionality in Discovery, 50 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3).
20. The amended Rule provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
21. See Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 19, at 16 (“Factor 6 is where the
proportionality standard’s rubber meets the road: it asks judges to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis . . . . The first five factors can be viewed as the ‘inputs’ in this
determination . . . .”).
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driven, organically evolving, free-flowing adversarialism of a bygone era.22
In its place, parties, through counsel, work with managerial—sometimes
autocratic—trial court judges who intentionally arrange the constituent
elements of litigation with a focus on value and conservation of resources.
In a technical sense, the 2015 amendments are merely a nudge in that
direction, but they are an important one. As Justice Roberts put it, they
seek to accomplish a wholesale “change in our legal culture.”23
II. SCARCITY AND CONTROL IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE:
UNBUNDLING, SOURCING, BUDGETING,
AND VALUE-BASED PRICING IN LITIGATION
Market forces are having a similar effect as sophisticated clients shift
their focus from cases to tasks and thus to the means by which litigation
aims are achieved.
A. The Traditional Lawyer-Client Relationship
Traditionally, the client has chosen the goals of litigation and the lawyer
has exercised broad discretion regarding the means.24 This is so both as a
formal and a practical matter.25 The ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (“the Model Rules”) provide that “a lawyer shall abide by a
client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as
required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued” but may “take such action on behalf of the client as
is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.”26 Furthermore,
22. See PAUL R. CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN & MICHAEL J. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL
CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 10 (1978) (“[C]hanges in the
federal discovery rules have gradually given the attorneys virtually unlimited discretion over
the initiation of discovery and the enforcement of discovery rights. . . . The rules now allow
the attorneys to decide whether and when to file requests and to determine the sequence and
frequency of filing. . . . Today’s rules confer no express authority on judges either to control
the initiation of discovery or to require compliance with the time limits set by the rules.”
(footnotes omitted)).
23. ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 11.
24. See generally Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps
Toward Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to Control
Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 (1990).
25. Unsophisticated clients rarely attempt to participate in choices regarding the means
by which litigation aims will be achieved. See Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic
Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 92–97 (reviewing empirical literature
demonstrating the lack of meaningful individual control by tort plaintiffs). This is especially
true in group litigation. See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty
and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519,
530–31 (finding nonclass mass actions to often bear the “hallmarks of collective
representation” with regard to “attenuated attorney-client relationships”).
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASSS’N 2016); see also id. r. 1.4
(A lawyer shall “reasonably consult” with the client regarding the means by which the
client’s objectives are to be accomplished.); id. r. 1.4 cmt. 3 (“In some situations—
depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of
consulting with the client—this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other
circumstances, such as during a trial . . . the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer
to act without prior consultation.”).

2156

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

“[c]lients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer
with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives,
particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters.”27 These
rules construct a means-ends distinction but do not define either term with
precision or explain the default amount of input lawyers should give clients
into the tasks chosen. The rules merely require that clients be kept apprised
of the status of the litigation and remain capable of making decisions
regarding costs.28 The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
sheds little additional light, other than confirming that lawyers have
discretion with regard to the means in general,29 subject to a poorly defined
obligation to reasonably consult with clients,30 and without the need even
for that when circumstances warrant.31 Indeed, the rules leave open the
possibility of a lawyer taking on a litigation matter on an hourly basis, with
limited input by the client as to means, subject only to the limits on what
constitutes an “unreasonable” fee.32
While, over the years, commentators have urged a less divided and more
collaborative and thoroughly negotiated lawyer-client relationship,33 it has
not been the norm outside of relatively limited settings. Increasingly,
however, sophisticated34 consumers of legal services are bridging the
means-ends divide.
B. A Changing Legal Services Market
The allocation of authority between lawyers and some clients has shifted
because sophisticated consumers now have not only the motive but also
effective means of controlling legal spending. The impetus for this shifting
27. Id. r. 1.2 cmt. 2 (“[L]awyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as
the expense to be incurred . . . .”).
28. See id. r. 1.4(a)(3).
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 21 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (“The lawyer begins with broad authority to make choices advancing the client’s
interests. But the client may limit the lawyer’s authority by contract or instructions.”); see
id. § 21 cmt. e (“A lawyer has authority to take any lawful measure within the scope of
representation that is reasonably calculated to advance a client’s objectives as defined by the
client unless there is a contrary agreement or instruction and unless a decision is reserved to
the client. A lawyer, for example, may decide whether to move to dismiss a complaint and
what discovery to pursue or resist.” (citations omitted)).
30. See id. § 20 cmt. c (“A lawyer must keep a client reasonably informed about the
status of a matter entrusted to the lawyer, including the progress, prospects, problems, and
costs of the representation.”).
31. See id. § 23 cmt. d (stating that lawyers need not consult with clients when time
pressures preclude them from doing so, such as during court hearings or trials).
32. See infra Part IV.B.
33. Monroe H. Freedman, Client-Centered Lawyering—What It Isn’t, 40 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 349, 353 (2011) (“Lawyers therefore act both professionally and morally in assisting
clients to maximize their autonomy.”); Alex J. Hurder, Negotiating the Lawyer-Client
Relationship: A Search for Equality and Collaboration, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 71, 79 (1996)
(“An approach favoring equality and collaboration would require that all decisions about the
terms of the lawyer-client relationship be made jointly by the lawyer and client.”).
34. For a review of the different ways in which consumers of legal services can be
“sophisticated,” see Fred C. Zacharias, The Preemployment Ethical Role of Lawyers: Are
Lawyers Really Fiduciaries?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569, 577 (2007).
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allocation is a belief that the law department can be managed on a budget,
similar to any other division within a company, and a corresponding desire
for predictability and value in the legal services used.35 The means include
increased market power of corporate consumers of legal services as a result
of better-staffed in-house legal departments,36 soft demand and entry of
new players,37 and innovation in the pricing of legal services enabled by
advances in project and information management.38 The upshot is that
empowered consumers are able to accomplish cost savings by shifting their
focus from cases to tasks, sourcing projects to the most cost-efficient
providers, and demanding litigation budgets and value-based pricing that
prompt greater collaboration between lawyer and client regarding the means
deployed to achieve litigation ends.
1. Procuring Litigation Services: Unbundling and Sourcing
Unbundled39 legal services are offered at the level of specific tasks that
make up a subset of all work necessary to achieve a given aim.40
35. SILVIA HODGES SILVERSTEIN, LEGAL PROCUREMENT HANDBOOK 15 (2015) (“Even as
the economy improves, CEOs and CFOs see legal departments as cost centers that need
efficient and effective management.”); Henderson, supra note 3, at 373 (“In response to
harsh economic conditions, the nation’s corporate clients have tightened their legal budgets
and altered their spending habits.”).
36. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 761 (stating
that expanded in-house counsel departments have allowed corporate general counsels to
“surmount information asymmetry problems in legal representation”); Christopher J. Whelan
& Neta Ziv, Privatizing Professionalism: Client Control of Lawyers’ Ethics, 80 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2577, 2583 (2012) (“Corporate counsel often ‘micro-manage’ outside counsel.
Their once-inferior status has been elevated and they now allocate, guide, control, and
supervise the work of outside counsel.”); David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals?: Toward a
New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2084
(2010) (“By the turn of the new century, this ‘inside counsel movement,’ as Robert Rosen
has accurately labeled the push for authority and professional recognition by general
counsel, appeared to have carried the day.”).
37. HILDEBRANDT CONSULTING LLC & CITI PRIVATE BANK, 2016 CLIENT ADVISORY 2
(2016), https://www.privatebank.citibank.com/pdf/2016CitiHildebrandtClientAdvisory.pdf
(“While the demand for traditional law firm services has remained relatively soft, the supply
of legal service providers has increased, creating a hyper-competitive market and forcing law
firms to rethink how they deliver legal services.” (footnote omitted))
[https://perma.cc/Y9BC-UWJP].
38. See PATRICK J. LAMB, ALTERNATIVE FEE ARRANGEMENTS: VALUE FEES AND THE
CHANGING LEGAL MARKET 52–53 (2010) (“For those who decide to utilise value-fee
arrangements, project-management skills are critical to the pricing process and to the equally
important management process that will ensure that lawyers operate within the cost structure
required once a price is quoted. . . . There is an intersection between project management
and knowledge management. One of the goals of both is the performance of work
efficiently.”).
39. “Legal services traditionally have been regarded as relatively ‘bundled,’ in the sense
that they consist of tightly linked elements that cannot be easily separated.” Milton C. Regan
& Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal
Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2148 (2010).
40. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(authorizing unbundled services if the limited scope representation is “reasonable under the
circumstances and the client gives informed consent”); ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447 (2007) (blessing “collaborative practice” models
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Unbundled services have traditionally been offered with regard to either
routine transactional tasks41 or, in litigation settings, to low-income clients
by legal services entities that aid them in self-representation, e.g., in
landlord-tenant or family law settings.42
However, especially since the Great Recession,43 sophisticated clients in
relatively less routinized categories of litigation have increasingly applied
procurement principles to disaggregate and source44 litigation work.
Procurement is a term for a department commonly found in large
corporations and government offices, but it is also a label for an approach to
sourcing and negotiating the terms for the provision of services.45 In
involving a limited scope of representation); ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (2007) (addressing ethical propriety of limited scope
representations of pro se litigants); MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, ABA, HANDBOOK ON
LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE (2003), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_handbook_on_limited_scope_legal_
assistance.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QCW-Q9VM]; Kathleen Bird & Melissa
Posey, Incorporating Limited Scope Representation into Your Law Practice Model (Sept. 12,
2014) (unpublished paper presented at the Missouri Bar 2014 Annual Meeting) (on file with
the Fordham Law Review) (“The client and lawyer negotiate an appropriate delegation of
tasks between the lawyer and client according to the difficulty and complexity of the issues
and the skills required.”).
41. Such services may be fully commodified, in that they are offered via automated
services such as LegalZoom, or may be offered by lawyers performing somewhat more
tailored but still high-volume routine services, e.g., via online marketplaces where lawyers
bid for the chance to work on legal tasks. See, e.g., AVVO, https://www.avvo.com/legalservices (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/VC9R-548M]; LEGAL HERO,
https://www.legalhero.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/KYT3-8DQ3].
42. Courts sometimes help litigants understand and find attorneys willing to provide
such unbundled services. See, e.g., Limited Scope Representation, CAL. CTS.,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/1085.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/TH7HYVZ7].
43. See Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big but Brittle: Economic Perspectives
on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 92 (“The
recession, with its widespread law-department budget cuts and thousands of large-firm
layoffs, seems to have awakened everyone involved to the forces that had been building for
years, and brought those forces more fully into play. Clients triaged their legal work and, as
to what was indispensable, began to scrutinize which constituent tasks truly needed high-end
staffing and which required not the ‘best,’ but just those good enough to accomplish the task
cost-effectively.”).
44. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF
LEGAL SERVICES, at xxxii (2008) (describing the example of Rio Tinto’s efforts to source
legal work to low cost providers); id. at 45–52 (describing different types of sourcing of
legal work); William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 462–63
(2013) (“Lawyers have a so-called monopoly on advocacy work before a tribunal and client
counseling on legal matters, but that is of little consolation. Virtually every other aspect of a
legal problem can be broken down into its component parts, reengineered, streamlined, and
turned into a legal input or legal product that is better, cheaper, and delivered much faster.”).
45. See, e.g., Silvia Hodges Silverstein, Research Report: The State of Legal
Procurement, in LEGAL PROCUREMENT HANDBOOK 126, 126 (Silvia Hodges Silverstein ed.,
2015) (“Procurement’s role in buying legal services keeps evolving. The three studies on the
state of legal procurement that I conducted in 2011, 2012, and 2014 clearly demonstrate that
procurement practices gain more and more influence on the category.”); Silvia Hodges,
Legal Procurement: Sourcing Is a Team Sport, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 29, 2012),
http://www.bna.com/legalprocurement-sourcing-is-a-team-sport/
[https://perma.cc/6KK9YAQN].
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litigation, it takes a variety of forms, including disaggregating and sourcing
matters in-house,46 to a captive center, to nonlawyer third parties,47 or to
one or more law firms.48 While much of the work is routinized, a growing
percentage of it includes such “higher-level” tasks as analyzing case law
and evidence.49
Though anecdotal evidence suggests a trend, the degree to which this
kind of unbundling and sourcing is happening in the U.S. legal services
market, especially in relatively complex, high value litigation, is unclear.
One 2011 study suggested that this unbundling was rare and that in-house
counsel still choose to give a good portion of their business to a stable
roster of firms.50 But the study relied on pre-Great Recession data. The
measurement problem is compounded by the fact that some law firms are
sourcing in-house, via self-branded divisions, or are partnering with legal
process outsourcing firms (LPOs).51 Evidence of the growth of sourcing
can be seen in the number of corporate litigants that now report using
LPOs52 and in the contrast between the rate of law firm growth, which is
generally flat, and the rate of growth of nonlawyer legal services companies
that provide much of the substitute legal services, which has been high. It
can also be seen in the “stickiness” of relationships between firms and
LPOs.53
46. BTI Consulting reported, based on research conducted between February and August
of 2016, that corporate clients moved in-house $4 billion of legal work that would have gone
to law firms in the prior year, including commercial and IP litigation. See Clients Bring $4
Billion In-House: For All the Wrong Reasons, BTI CONSULTING GROUP (Sept. 7, 2016),
http://www.bticonsulting.com/themadclientist/2016/9/7/clients-bring-4-billion-in-house-forall-the-wrong-reasons [https://perma.cc/5SU2-8P77].
47. See, e.g., Regan & Heenan, supra note 39, at 2150 (“Consider, for instance, the
range of different activities in which [legal process outsourcing firm] CPA Global engages.
It includes preparing summonses and complaints, interrogatories and requests for production
of documents, motions, witness kits, timelines of events and exhibits, deposition summaries
in various formats, memoranda of law, legal briefs, letters to third parties . . . .” (citation
omitted)).
48. See John S. Dzienkowski, The Future of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service
Providers to Corporate Clients, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2995, 2998 (2014) (“[C]orporate
clients at one time used one law firm for all or most of their outside legal work. Today,
corporations often rely upon teams of lawyers from different law firms . . . .” (citation
omitted)).
49. Cassandra Burke Robertson, A Collaborative Model of Offshore Legal Outsourcing,
43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 125, 133 (2011).
50. See John C. Coates et al., Hiring Teams, Firms, and Lawyers: Evidence of the
Evolving Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 999 (2011).
51. For example, Valorem Law Group, one of the leaders in flat-fee pricing of litigation
services, partners with Novus Law, a document review LPO. See Valorem’s Strategic
Alliance with Novis Law, VALOREM L. GROUP, http://www.valoremlaw.com/novus-law (last
visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/JK3T-MF42].
52. See, e.g., NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, 2015 LITIGATION TRENDS ANNUAL SURVEY 31
(2015), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/20150514-2015-litigation-trends-survey_
v24-128746.pdf (reporting that a plurality of respondents had worked with a law firm that
used a legal process outsourcing provider for elements of work, worked directly with an
LPO, or used their own captive center) [https://perma.cc/2J8N-N9NW].
53. Robertson, supra note 49, at 127 (citing as evidence of the “mainstreaming” of legal
process outsourcing that clients who experiment “tend to continue their contracts and
institutionalize the practice”).
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Client-driven sourcing erodes the means-end divide that traditionally
characterized the attorney-client relationship by shifting the client’s focus
from cases to tasks and giving clients control over how those tasks are
performed and by whom.
Litigation budgets and alternative fee
arrangements (AFAs), discussed below, are less direct but still potent
market developments having a similar effect.
2. Pricing Litigation Services: Budgeting and AFAs
Increasingly, sophisticated clients insist on detailed litigation budgets
building off worksheets that disaggregate litigation into constituent tasks,54
assigning values to each. The preparation and discussion of budgets brings
clients into the decision-making process regarding litigation means in a
conversation that is typically about value and priorities. As one attorney
recently put it:
Do not underestimate the power of a well-designed litigation budget to
clarify thinking about a case and set client expectations about how it will
be handled. A well-designed budget is more than a financial estimate; it
sets priorities, reflects strategy and projects staffing. Increasingly, buyers
of legal services expect well-designed budgets, and how firms create and
use budgets is a factor in deciding which firms to hire.55

AFAs broadly include all nonhourly fee arrangements, including hybrid
arrangements such as discounted billing with caps or success fees.56 Some
commentators see arrangements that merely repackage or moderately shift
some of the risks to be hourly billing in disguise and view only fee
arrangements that do not depend on hours spent to be “true” AFAs, such as
“fixed” or “flat” fees for a defined service or legal product. Fixed fees can
be set for each stage of a single civil action, for the entirety of the action, or
for a group of actions or a category of litigation, and they can include
modifications such as holdbacks or collars.57 In general, AFAs, excluding

54. See GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE
THE STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET 10 (2017) (identifying as

LEGAL PROFESSION, REPORT ON
a “major shift that has occurred
over the past decade” the “widespread client insistence on budgets (with caps) for both
transactional and litigation matters”); Gary L. Sasso, Budgets, CARLTON FIELDS,
https://www.carltonfields.com/budgets-business-solutions/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2017)
(providing guidance on legal expense budgeting, including a sample budget worksheet)
[https://perma.cc/BW7Z-F6NR].
55. Richard A. De Palma & William T. Garcia, Proper Litigation Budgeting Delivers
True Value to Clients, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
id=1202723070676/Proper-Litigation-Budgeting-Delivers-True-Value-to-Clients
[https://
perma.cc/7QSS-PSJD].
56. See, e.g., ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL, HANDBOOK FOR VALUE-BASED BILLING
ENGAGEMENTS 1 (2014), http://www.acc.com/advocacy/valuechallenge/toolkit/loader.cfm?cs
Module=security/getfile&pageid=1309263&page=/legalresources/resource.cfm&qstring=sh
ow=1309263&title=Guide%20to%20Value%20Based%20Billing&recorded=1 (noting that
value-based billing includes fixed or flat fees, fixed fees with collars, reverse contingent
fees, success fees, and performance-based holdbacks, among other mechanisms)
[https://perma.cc/N7KL-RPYU].
57. On its website, under the heading “Phased Fixed Fee with Collar,” Paul Hastings
describes its collar arrangement:
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discounting, constituted about 16 percent of surveyed firms’ revenues in
2015, flat from the prior year, though law firm managers expected that
number to rise over time.58
Much of the move to value-based pricing is client driven and tangled
with the unbundling and sourcing described in the preceding section. By
way of example, Pfizer created the Pfizer Legal Alliance (PLA) in 2009, a
group of law firms that handled the majority of the firm’s work on a flat-fee
basis, using a common set of project and information management tools and
subject to Pfizer’s directions regarding the outsourcing of certain types of
legal work to nonlawyer third parties.59
Law firms offering alternative pricing arrangements range from big
firms, such as Kirkland & Ellis60 and Morgan Lewis,61 to smaller, nimbler
firms that litigate predominantly or exclusively on this basis and make it a
centerpiece of their online marketing.62 Like budgeting, value pricing has
the potential to erode the means-end distinction to the extent it inspires a

Based on hourly fees subject to a case budget and a collar (a range above and
below the budget). If the fees are less than the lower collar, outside counsel
receives a bonus. If the fees are higher than the upper collar, the client receives a
discount from the regular hourly rate.
See Alternative Fee Arrangements, PAUL HASTINGS, http://www.paulhastings.com/area/
litigation/alternative-fee-arrangements (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/RP9KP78U].
58. See HILDEBRANDT CONSULTING LLC & CITI PRIVATE BANK, supra note 37, at 7
(surveying mostly large firms, and noting that “the use of AFAs has not increased at the rate
many observers had predicted, although according to the Citi 2015 Law Firm Leaders
Survey, a majority are still expecting growth in the years ahead”); NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT,
supra note 52, at 25 (reporting a majority of corporate clients using AFAs, with larger
companies being the most active users, but typically for only a fraction of their litigation
spending); id. at 28–29 (reporting a majority of respondents holding the view that use of
AFAs will remain flat but with 41 percent of larger companies expecting use of AFAs to
rise).
59. Ellen Rosenthal & Justin McCarthy, Pfizer Inc.’s Legal Alliance Program:
Collaboration and Focus on Relationships Produce Better Legal Outcomes and CostSavings, ASS’N CORP. COUNS. (2011), http://www.acc.com/advocacy/valuechallenge/toolkit/
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=1279390&page=/valuechallenge/resources/i
ndex.cfm&qstring=&title=Pfizer%20Inc.%26%2339%3Bs%20Legal%20Alliance%20Progr
am3A%20Collaborationand%20Focus%20on%20Relationships%20Produce%20Better%20
Outcomes%20and%20Cost-savings&recorded=1 [https://perma.cc/P27W-VQG2].
60. See Alternative Fee Arrangements, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, https://
www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=341 (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/BMH7-BA6H].
61. See Press Release, Morgan Lewis, Morgan Lewis Named Among the Best by Clients
for Alternative Fee Arrangements (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.morganlewis.com/news/
morgan-lewis-named-among-the-best-by-clients-for-alternative-fee-arrangements
[https://
perma.cc/3PDX-7T5K].
62. Those firms include Bartlit, Beck, Herman, Palenchar & Scott, LLP; Seyfarth Shaw,
LLP; and Valorem Law Group. See Seyfarth Lean, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP,
http://www.seyfarth.com/SeyfarthLean-Overview (last
visited
Mar.
25,
2017)
[https://perma.cc/T3BJ-9F3L]; Success Based Fees, BARTLIT, BECK, HERMAN, PALENCHAR &
SCOTT, LLP, http://www.bartlit-beck.com/about-success.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/J4AB-JZZ6]; What’s So Revolutionary?, VALOREM L. GROUP,
http://www.valoremlaw.com/what-is-revolutionary (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/YR83-N2AD].
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higher degree of collaboration between lawyer and client.63 That
collaboration typically occurs at the front end as lawyer and client build
assumptions regarding the scope of representation and work to be done for
a fixed fee into the representation agreement itself.64
Value pricing has the potential to restrain litigators and lawyer-driven
adversarialism not only via direct client input but also by better aligning the
incentives of lawyers and cost-conscious clients. AFAs such as fixed fees
reward and thus inspire efficiency. One attorney for a firm that has been at
the leading edge of flat-fee litigation in high-stakes, complex cases
described its effects on discovery and motion practice:
The substantial majority of time and money spent in big case litigation is
spent in discovery: e-discovery and production of irrelevant data and
documents by the millions, seven-hour depositions of insignificant
witnesses by the dozens, motion after motion on such matters as where to
conduct depositions or which proposed pretrial schedule is more
reasonable. . . .
These practices are the progeny of the billable hour. Lawyers on flat
fees (or contingent fees) abhor inefficiency and avoid the discovery
morass.65

Sourcing, budgeting, and risk-sharing pricing arrangements are not new.
For example, insurance companies have for many years aggressively used
litigation budgets and pricing controls to cabin attorney discretion regarding
litigation tasks.66 What is new is the pervasiveness of these mechanisms.
The Association of Corporate Counsel, a professional association for inhouse attorneys, now identifies as favored practices by general counsels a
cluster of value-based mechanisms, including “[v]alue-based fee
structures,” “[o]utsourcing contract work to legal process outsourcing
vendors,” and “[p]ractices for managing outside counsel performance.”67
63. See, e.g., Ed Poll, Clients Define Value Billing—But Will They Accept It?, LAW
PRAC. TODAY (June 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/
law_practice_today_home/lpt-archives/june13/clients-define-value-billing-but-will-theyaccept-it.html (“Value billing can only work through the kind of interaction that is best
described as true lawyer-client collaboration. In such a relationship, client and lawyer work
together to assess needs and develop a proactive, interactive law approach, making
recommendations to each other about actions and decisions that are mutually beneficial.”)
[https://perma.cc/2MH6-AVDT].
64. See PATRICK LAMB, ALTERNATIVE FEES FOR LITIGATORS AND THEIR CLIENTS 48
(2014) (“There are general assumptions built into every fee agreement, including the likely
volume of documents, the issues (broadly defined, such as ‘no counterclaim’), the likely
number of depositions, the time frame of events, number of witnesses, time to trial, and so
forth. All assumptions underlying the fee structure should be specified.”).
65. Kathryn Kirmayer, From the Experts: In Support of Flat Fee Pricing for Complex
Litigation Matters, CORP. COUNS. (May 16, 2012), https://www.crowell.com/files/InSupport-of-Flat-Fee-Pricing-for-Complex-Litigation-Matters.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ES2TS5YJ].
66. See Susan Randall, Managed Litigation and the Professional Obligations of
Insurance Defense Lawyers, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2001) (describing insurance
litigation practices).
67. See ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL, GC VALUE INSIGHTS: WHAT MULTINATIONAL
GENERAL COUNSEL VALUE MOST 4 (2012), http://www.acc.com/advocacy/valuechallenge/
toolkit/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=1316714&page=/valuechallenge/reso
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III. CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE OF REGULATORY
AND MARKET MECHANISMS FOR RESTRAINING LAWYERS
The regulatory and market developments described in the preceding part
differ along a number of dimensions summarized in table 1 below. First
and foremost, their scope varies. The changes in procedural doctrine that
have enabled managerial judging formally apply to all civil actions, even if
courts are likely to be relatively more interventionist in complex cases.
Moreover, the particular focus on proportionality in discovery, which
requires the judge to assess the value of each disputed request, applies
across the board. In contrast, client intervention in the means by which
litigation aims are achieved, for example, by sourcing, budgeting, or
manipulating counsel’s incentives via fee arrangements, typically occurs in
those cases where clients are sufficiently sophisticated, have sufficient
leverage, and are more interested in controlling legal spending than
outspending an opponent.68
The purposes of the amendments to the Rules and developments in the
private sphere also differ. Whereas the procedural amendments are
designed to achieve the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action,”69 private contract serves client aims, which may or may not
point in the same direction.
Even when client and court aims align, the obstacles to controlling
litigation costs vary in each sphere. Information asymmetries plague clients
and courts when they seek to participate in litigation. But, in the public
domain, the court can rely on the adversarial process to present some of the
necessary information. For example, a party with a winning and dispositive
motion can be relied upon to identify and help chart a direct path to that
motion in the course of a Rule 16 conference, even if the other party hopes
to delay or complicate it. No comparable adversarial process serves a
similar monitoring function in the private sphere, where agency costs
persist despite the attempts to cabin attorney discretion described in Part
II.70 Moreover, in the private domain, even an interventionist client who
aggressively seeks to control legal spending, can find it difficult to monitor
counsel, especially if counsel’s fees are not tied to efficient outcomes. For
example, a lawyer working on an hourly basis pursuant to an agreed
urces/index.cfm&qstring=&title=GC%20Value%20Insights&recorded=1 [https://perma.cc/
4AFX-LTDN].
68. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 100 (2013) (“The legal framework is supposed to make our
economy more efficient by providing incentives for individuals and firms not to behave
badly. But we have designed a legal system that is an arms race: the two protagonists work
hard to out-lawyer each other, which is to say outspend each other.”).
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
70. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (defining
agency costs); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84
VA. L. REV. 1707, 1709 (1998) (“Agency costs are potentially significant in legal
representation because the client delegates significant discretion to the lawyer but incurs
high monitoring costs because of the specialized and idiosyncratic nature of professional
work.”).
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litigation budget carefully mapped with a client could nevertheless subtly
inspire opposing counsel’s distrust and ire to the point where disputes and
fees proliferate, all the while proclaiming that the extra costs are beyond the
agent’s control.
Finally, the limits on lawyer discretion achieved via procedure and
private contract vary with regard to their equity. Procedure offers the
possibility, at least, of being evenly applied; whereas, as a practical matter,
private contract as a means of controlling attorney decision making is
mostly available to sophisticated clients.
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Table 1: Comparison Chart (Regulatory v. Market)
Regulatory (Procedure)

Market (Unbundling,
Sourcing, and AFAs)

Scope

All federal court cases

Matters in which lawyers
and clients include
relevant terms in their
representation
agreements

Purposes

“The just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination
of every action,” per
Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 1

Client aims, typically
including controlling
legal spending

Vehicle

Judicial involvement in
identification and
assessment of the value
and sequencing of
litigation tasks

Obstacles to
Efficacy

Variation among judges
and cases, information
asymmetries, and limits of
Rule 16 and inability to
fully control parties
Available in all cases but
typically applied more
aggressively in “large”
cases (e.g., MDLs)

Client involvement in
identification and
assessment of the
sourcing, value, and
sequencing of litigation
tasks
Agency problems,
including information
asymmetries and
inability to control court
or other parties
Available to
sophisticated clients who
demand it or when
lawyers choose to offer
these options

Fairness
(Equality of
Application)

Despite their differences, the cabining of lawyer discretion and lawyerdriven adversarialism accomplished via managerial judging and private
contract have the potential to reinforce each other. For example, a court
seeking to sequence litigation tasks depends in part on the parties to
cooperate, such as by providing information and participating in a case
management conference to advance the aims of Rule 1. A lawyer’s
incentive to assist depends in part on the degree to which clients are
effectively controlling legal spending. A lawyer hired on an hourly basis
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without an active and involved client focused on the value of litigation tasks
may find himself motivated by the self-interested desire to maximize his
fee, thus frustrating Rule 16’s cost-saving function.71 Conversely, a lawyer
whose client is promoting value-based decision making by paying attention
to the means, sourcing to the lowest cost providers, or insisting on pricing
mechanisms that privilege efficiency is likelier to find his own self-interest
more fully aligned with the aims of Rule 1. Similarly, a client focused on
controlling legal spending may find an ally in a particularly active
managerial judge who sequences tasks in a manner designed to most
efficiently resolve the litigation. Conversely, the client may be frustrated
by a judge who gives parties and their counsel greater free reign.
IV. PRACTICES AND DUTIES
As a practical matter, due to the pincer-like effect of changes in both the
public and private domains, lawyer-driven adversarialism may be housed in
a smaller space, as discretion is limited by court and clients who have
increasing opportunities and means to unpack cases into tasks and to dictate
which tasks lawyers will pursue and how. With the right judge or client, a
lawyer may experience a substantial shift in control and, to the extent court
and client are driven by the desire to contain costs, will be forced to think
deeply and inclusively about the value of tasks.
But what about the lawyer whose judge is not particularly managerial or
whose client pays an hourly fee and asks few questions about the means?
Do the trends described in Part II suggest that all lawyers have a duty to
engage with court or client in litigation choices that have traditionally been
left to the lawyer’s discretion? Specifically, do all lawyers have an
obligation to sequence case activity, source work, or otherwise map
litigation tasks onto a budget that permits value-based discussions regarding
the means to be pursued to achieve litigation aims?72
In the procedural sphere, the formal duties baked into Rule 1 have
already changed as a result of the December 2015 amendment; the open
question is the extent to which that amendment will change behavior of
court and counsel. In the private sphere, behaviors are changing in some
sectors of the legal services market. An obstacle to formal reform is a
conceptualization of the role of the negotiation associated with the retention
of an attorney and structuring of the lawyer-client relationship as

71. See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action:
Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2200 (1989) (noting that the “significant
shift in recent decades from fixed-fee to hourly-fee charging by lawyers” was altering the
“dynamics of the process” of litigation).
72. The market developments sketched in Part II are occurring in the corporate
“hemisphere” of the legal services market. Disruption may come from below, but norm
change often occurs at the top end of the legal services market, which continues to garner
outsized attention and to influence common perceptions of professional roles. Vincent R.
Johnson & Virginia Coyle, On the Transformation of the Legal Profession: The Advent of
Temporary Lawyering, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 359, 364 (1990) (“[E]vents which affect
larger firms have a ‘trickle-down’ effect.”).
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contractual rather than fiduciary.73 That is, the discussion of the scope of
the representation, the manner in which fees and costs will be handled, the
sharing of risk, and the sourcing of work are all seen as taking place as part
of an arm’s-length negotiation, a characterization that provides infertile soil
for the development of duties.
A. Duties to Court
The recent amendments to the Rules make clear that, at least as far as the
court is concerned, the litigator’s duties have indeed changed or have at
least been sharpened. The extent to which the December 2015 amendments
truly represent a cultural shift depends on the eagerness of trial court judges
to push the boundaries of their inherent authority and on counsel’s and
parties’ willingness to prioritize the aims of Rule 1.
There is anecdotal evidence that the Rule 1 amendment is beginning to
have its intended effects. Courts are citing both the amendment and Justice
Roberts’s explanation of it when issuing case management orders and
deciding discovery disputes regarding proportionality in a way that suggests
they acknowledge a shift toward greater judicial control of litigation
choices. For example, Judge Edward G. Smith of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania has posted a “Policies and Procedures” document citing and
quoting the Rule 1 amendment and Justice Roberts as framing the court’s
expectations regarding Rule 16 case management conferences and the
discovery process.74 Also, by way of example, Magistrate Judge Elizabeth
Laporte recently cited and quoted both the amendments and Justice
Roberts’s annual report when applying the relocated proportionality
requirement in a discovery dispute.75 The court found, ultimately, that the
parties had not sufficiently addressed the value of the specific discovery
request and that, in Magistrate Judge Laporte’s view, the discovery sought
did not appear to be proportional to the amount at stake in the litigation.76
These are mostly matters of tone, with courts using the amendments to
underscore their responsibility to manage litigation tasks.
It is possible that we will even see Rule 16 aggressively applied to the
point where courts adopt lawyer-restraining mechanisms deployed in the
private domain. In a provocative and thoughtful article, Professor Jay
73. See Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, Fiduciaries and Fees: Preliminary Thoughts,
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1833, 1837–38 (2011) (describing the negotiations around the
formation of the attorney-client relationship as a contractual rather than a fiduciary moment);
Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 55 (1989) (“[F]ee contracts entered into prior to or
contemporaneously with the commencement of the attorney-client relationship are
irrebuttably presumed to be arm’s length transactions, governed by contract and not by
fiduciary law.”). But see Zacharias, supra note 34, at 573 nn.4–5 (citing scholars and courts
identifying lawyers’ preemployment fiduciary duties).
74. See generally Memorandum on Policies and Procedures, Edward G. Smith, Judge,
E.D. Pa., https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/procedures/smtpol.pdf (last updated
July 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7EC9-983L].
75. Dao v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., No. 14-cv-04749-SI, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28268, at *5–7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016).
76. Id. at *14.
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Tidmarsh recently proposed that courts consider imposing litigation
budgets.77 The idea is to require litigants to submit, seek court approval of,
and stay within budgets, something British courts have required since
2013.78
There is some precedent for an American federal court judge, acting as
fiduciary for certain kinds of plaintiffs, to influence litigation budgets. For
example, judges appointing class counsel are encouraged to consider
“requesting that counsel submit ex parte or under seal a proposed budget for
fees in the case.”79 Similarly, trial courts, appointed by the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation to oversee MDLs80 may address litigation
expenses in case management orders, if only for the purpose of tracking and
distinguishing common costs rather than cabining them.81 MDL judges
also impose back-end fee caps, both when awarding common benefit fees
and when limiting fees that can be charged by individually retained counsel,
relying not just on law particular to MDLs but on their inherent authority to
regulate lawyers.82 But, as Professor Tidmarsh acknowledges, the idea of
court-imposed litigation budgets that impose ex ante limits on party
expenditures is “radical”83 and raises a number of concerns, including the
judge’s competence to set budgets,84 gamesmanship in the budget setting
process,85 and questions of authority.86

77. Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855 (2015).
78. Id. at 859.
79. BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 8 (3d ed. 2010) (noting, however, that “[f]ew
judges have unilaterally imposed strict limits on fees in the order of appointment”).
80. See Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict
Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1986 (2011) (“An MDL is created when the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) transfers related cases pending in diverse federal
district courts to a designated forum for consolidated pretrial motions and discovery.”).
81. See generally DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, STANDARDS AND BEST
PRACTICES FOR LARGE AND MASS TORT MDLS 46 (2014) (discussing mechanisms used by
MDL judges to track fees and costs); id. at 66 (discussing creation of court-ordered common
benefit funds in MDL proceedings); BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & CATHERINE R. BORDEN,
MANAGING MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A POCKET GUIDE FOR
TRANSFEREE JUDGES 15 (2011) (“If lead counsel are to receive attorney fees, set guidelines in
an early pretrial order after consultation with counsel. Establishing guidelines and ground
rules—even establishing budgets or rates for payment—early in the litigation helps ease the
judge’s burden and prevent later disputes.”); Leonard A. Davis & Philip A. Garrett, Case
Time and Cost Management for Plaintiffs in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 483,
498–505 (2014) (describing typical procedures).
82. See Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L.
REV. 371, 380 (2014) (“With regard to a court’s inherent authority to exercise ethical
supervision over the parties in MDL matters, courts have relied on the broad equitable
powers of a federal court over an attorney’s contingent fee contract.”); Morris A. Ratner,
Achieving Procedural Goals Through Indirection: The Use of Ethics Doctrine to Justify
Contingency Fee Caps in MDL Aggregate Settlements, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59, 73–76
(2013) (exploring inherent authority doctrine as applied to regulate fees in MDLs).
83. Tidmarsh, supra note 77, at 859.
84. Id. at 895.
85. Id. at 910.
86. Id. at 912 (“[I]t is doubtful that litigation budgets fall within the Supreme Court’s
power . . . under the Rules Enabling Act.”).
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B. Duties of Lawyer to Client
As between lawyer and client, the trends described in Part II have not yet
evolved into professional duties and, as noted, instead appear to be treated
as instances of private contract reshaping the lawyer-client relationship
rather than as a template for a new default87 relationship between all
lawyers and clients. An inquiry into whether change is afoot invites us to
map the space between emerging “best practices” and duties. To the extent
duties derive from norms,88 and to the extent norms emerge in part from
professional discourse and practices,89 the amplification of interest and
concern regarding scarcity and control with regard to the selection,
sequencing, and sourcing of litigation tasks suggests that we could be at a
tipping point where changing client needs and best practices designed to
meet those needs impact duties.90 If so, we know where to look, including
in the rules that allocate authority between court and party and between
lawyer and client and those that define competence and reasonable fees.
These duties will be defined and enforced by the usual array of regulatory
vehicles, including disciplinary bodies (for example, self-regulation), courts
regulating counsel via orders on fees and costs, and private litigation (for
example, malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty).
1. Allocating Authority
The Model Rules discussed at the outset of Part II.A build on a traditional
means-ends distinction with the lawyer, under the default rule, having
substantial discretion to choose the means deployed to accomplish the
client’s aims. What would change look like? Model Rule 1.4 could be
interpreted to require more fulsome and value-oriented discussion of
litigation tasks, including methods for reducing costs such as sourcing to
lowest-cost providers. The connection between the current text of Model
Rule 1.4 and emerging best practices is the requirement that lawyers
87. See Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 667 (2001)
(defining “default” rules as those that can be changed contractually).
88. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1241
(1991) (“[O]ver the last twenty-five years or so the traditional norms have undergone
important changes. One important development is that those norms have become
‘legalized.’ The rules of ethics have ceased to be internal to the profession; they have
instead become a code of public law enforced by formal adjudicative disciplinary process.”).
89. This is especially so with regard to duties that turn on objective standards of
reasonableness, such as the duty of care or the conception of a “reasonable” fee. For an
example of a competing account of the process by which norms are enshrined as duties in the
ethics rules, see Lynn A. Baker, The Politics of Legal Ethics: Case Study of a Rule Change,
53 ARIZ. L. REV. 425 (2011) (reviewing the politics of an amendment of a Texas ethics rule
regarding fee sharing).
90. See David B. Wilkins, Redefining the “Professional” in Professional Ethics: An
Interdisciplinary Approach to Teaching Professionalism, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241,
249 (1995) (“Whatever may be said of ethics in general, professional ethics must be
designed to serve specific societal needs. As such, it cannot be separated from the social,
economic, and political contexts in which these needs arise and through which they must be
met.”); cf. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and Contemporary Law Firm Practice, 70
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931, 941 (2002) (assessing the impact of the way corporations use law
firms on legal norms and lawyers’ exercise of discretion).
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“reasonably consult”91 with clients regarding means. To the extent
practices and thus expectations are changing, there is space in the current
text for regulatory authorities to catch up. Without linking the duty to this
particular provision of the Model Rules, Professor Fred Zacharias made a
similar suggestion: “In some situations, a client is well advised to use a
particular lawyer for limited purposes, leaving other aspects of the potential
representation to another lawyer, a non-lawyer service provider, or pro se
representation.”92
2. The Duty of Competence
In litigation, disputes regarding attorney competence typically flow from
a loss on the merits, which calls the lawyer’s skill, knowledge, or
preparation into question. That focus flows naturally from the economics
of malpractice litigation, where parties may be particularly inspired by
unwanted case outcomes to sue their former attorneys for professional
negligence. But the duty of competence also extends to law office
management issues that impact the lawyer-client relationship. Recent and
swift changes in expectations regarding lawyer knowledge of data security
provide a case in point, where technological change inspired a formal
expansion of the duty of competence.93
Along those lines, the practices described in Part II suggest that lawyers
may need to acquire new skills, including the ability to disaggregate and
properly source production of legal services, manage information
sufficiently to reasonably estimate project costs, and bring projectmanagement principles to bear in litigation.94 With regard to sourcing, the
duty of competence thus far has been applied only to ensure that the lawyer
who outsources maintains responsibility for the quality of the work product
and should normally consult with the client before outsourcing.95 It has not
been extended to require expertise with the decomposition, management,
and sourcing of legal work.

91. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
92. Zacharias, supra note 34, at 578. As services like Jurbid and Upcounsel that require
lawyers to bid on matters become more widespread and regularly used, the market may force
what the rules currently do not. See, e.g., JURBID, http://www.jurbid.com (last visited Mar.
25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9XAE-NHAL]; UPCOUNSEL, https://www.upcounsel.com (last
visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8EQL-TPKW].
93. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (requiring lawyers to keep
abreast of changes in technology); Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility
& Conduct, Formal Op. 2010-179 (2010) (recognizing a duty of competence and care when
lawyers transmit client data); Cloud Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/resour
ces/charts_fyis/cloud-ethics-chart.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/29W9PSZQ].
94. See LAMB, supra note 64, at 144 (“If there is no disaggregation strategy, the firm
hasn’t eliminated the fat.”); Regan & Heenan, supra note 39, at 2163 (“Even on the more
modest scale of individual projects, law firms may need to develop better project
management skills than many currently possess.”).
95. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 4.02 (4th ed.
2015).
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Again, to look for the emergence of such duties, we might look first to
spaces where sophisticated repeat players (judges or lead plaintiffs under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act) act on behalf of
unsophisticated, one-shot clients (MDL plaintiffs or absent class members)
when selecting counsel. Rule 23(g) provides the touchstone for the inquiry
into proposed class counsel’s adequacy, providing a nonexhaustive list that
includes items such as class counsel’s “experience” and “knowledge,” but
does not touch on the kinds of items sophisticated clients consider when
hiring counsel as described in Part II.96 Courts appointing counsel
sometimes mention efficiency and cost consciousness as a factor but
usually without describing the competencies necessary to achieve such
efficiency. The order appointing counsel in In re J.P. Morgan Chase Cash
Balance Litigation97 is typical. There, the court indicated it was appointing
counsel after being assured they would “work together efficiently” and,
toward that end, “fairly, adequately, and economically represent the
interests of the class” without specifying exactly how they would do so,
other than by implying the three appointed firms would avoid duplication of
labor.98 While the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was designed
to give sophisticated institutional investors a major role in the selection and
monitoring of class counsel, there is little either in case law or commentary
suggesting they have done so by vetting attorneys for project and
information management skills or the ability to budget or source tasks.99
3. Reasonable Fees and Costs
If the developments sketched in Part II are to impact conceptions of the
reasonableness of fees, we are likely to see them do so in at least two
spaces: a lowering of the ceiling on reasonable fees, especially for routine
legal tasks, and a change in the labeling of some tasks in terms of whether
they can support fees or are costs which are to be merely reimbursed.
Model Rule 1.5 defines the ethical prohibition on charging unreasonable
fees, one echoed in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.
The reasonableness requirement that governs fee disputes and disciplinary
proceedings focuses on identifying those fee agreements that are beyond the
pale100 and does not attempt to memorialize best practices, in terms of
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g).
97. 242 F.R.D. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
98. Id. at 277.
99. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker et al., Is the Price Right?: An Empirical Study of FeeSetting in Securities Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371, 1424 (2015) (“Our data
suggest that some lead plaintiffs do take seriously the responsibility Congress bestowed on
them, carefully choosing their lawyers, aggressively negotiating fees with them upfront, and
actively monitoring them throughout. But such plaintiffs are in the minority.”); Stephen J.
Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter?: The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 900 (2005) (“Private
institutions are clearly not keeping fees in check.”).
100. See, e.g., Bushman v. State Bar of Cal., 522 P.2d 312, 314 (Cal. 1974) (“It is settled
that gross overcharge of a fee by an attorney may warrant discipline.”); In re Dorothy, 605
N.W.2d 493, 501 (S.D. 2000) (finding fees charged in a divorce and custody case excessive
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tethering lawyer and client interests, encouraging risk sharing, prompting
client input on litigation choices, and the like. But as lawyers continue to
compete for business using project management techniques, sourcing, and
alternative fees, the ceiling on what lawyers can charge for equivalent work
should lower as a result of Model Rule 1.5(a)(3), which looks to, among
other factors bearing on the reasonableness of a fee, “the fee customarily
charged in the locality for similar legal services.”101
Similarly, as sophisticated clients insist that lawyers source some
litigation tasks to lowest-cost providers, including nonlawyer service
companies, some tasks, like document review, which were once routinely
performed by lawyers at their usual rates, should, over time, come to be
seen as lower-rate work102 or even as bases for expenses rather than fees,
the way copying costs are treated. While lawyers and clients may be
increasingly negotiating such arrangements, a failure to do so does not yet
appear to amount to an unreasonable fee. On the contrary, authority
suggests that even routine legal work may be charged at regular rates.103
That said, because reasonableness is still assessed by reference to what
others charge for similar work, this should be a continuing pressure point
with regard to lawyers’ duties going forward.
CONCLUSION
Courts and some clients are responding to scarcity by shifting their
attention from “cases” to “tasks” and attempting to ensure that the value of
each litigation task is justified. Part IV maps the spaces to search for
evidence of changing legal norms and duties flowing from these
developments. Rule 1 accomplishes that norm change directly as a formal
matter. The ethics rules and other laws governing lawyers do not yet appear
to have converted emerging practices in the corporate hemisphere into
broadly applicable duties; but the process of identifying the places to look
for such change also reveals the leverage points where change can be

on the facts of that case, and noting that “[c]ourts have noted the importance of efficiency in
determining an appropriate amount of attorney’s fees”).
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
102. See LAMB, supra note 64, at 144–45 (“For cases with a sufficient number of
documents, the best answer, in my view, is that document review (not just first-level review,
but all review right up until partners lay hands on the documents) should be outsourced.
There are professional reviewers who do more, offering higher quality and more useful work
product, than any law firm could consider, for a fraction of the cost.”); NICHOLAS M. PACE &
LAURA ZAKARAS, WHERE THE MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR
PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 45 (2012) (“It is not likely, however, that clients will
continue to accept the notion that paralegals or newly hired associates assigned to routine
discovery tasks should bill their services at the same rates used for their trial appearances or
appellate-brief writing.”).
103. See, e.g., ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-420
(2000) (“When costs associated with legal services of a contract lawyer are billed to the
client as fees for legal services, the amount that may be charged for such services is
governed by the requirement of Model Rule 1.5(a) that a lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. A
surcharge to the costs may be added by the billing lawyer if the total charge represents a
reasonable fee for services provided to the client.”).
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effectuated. Examples include litigation settings where courts act as
fiduciaries and disputes regarding fees and the lawyer’s duty of care.

